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LEGAL EDUCATION: LAW,
LAWYERS, AND ETHICS
Robert B. McKay*
NE might expect me to talk about Watergate, since the subject

is lawyers and ethics, but Chief Justice Warren covered that
very well today. He laid it on the Watergate line, and I
accept everything he said.
I wish to begin more remotely with a theological illusion from
an earlier and more placid time. My story is about a gentleman
who asked the Episcopal Bishop of Virginia if a non-Episcopalian
could be admitted to Heaven. The Bishop modestly replied that
he could not be certain. Then, on further reflection, he said he
was sure of one thing at least. If the non-Episcopalian in question
were truly a gentleman, he would not seek entrance to Heaven.
Today you will see that I am no gentleman. Not because I seek
to crash the gates of Heaven, prematurely or otherwise, but because
I have some iconoclastic, even some unpleasant, things to say about
legal education, particularly about the inadequate attention the law
schools have given legal ethics and professional responsibility.
Today we are here to celebrate the happy occasion of -the 75th
anniversary of a great university and I am glad to discover, as I
checked the history, that the law school was actually in existence
one year before the university. In short, first things first. Seventyfive years is not a very long time in the story of higher education,
but it is a very long time in the history of legal education. Nearly
all the important things in legal education and nearly all the effective training has occurred within the last seventy-five years, and in
fact, even a rather shorter period than that.
Three quarters of a century ago, law school training was just
emerging from a period in which legal education had been con*
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sidered of no great importance. You may recall that during the
Jacksonian period, before the Civil War, the prevailing notion was
that every person could be a lawyer. There were no educational
requirements for admission to the bar, no licensing procedures.
Some of you who are now in law school may think that was a better
day; but I cannot agree. After the Civil War, during the excesses
of the reconstruction period and the impatience of the industrial
period, little attention was given to legal education or to the ethical
niceties of the practice of law.
Nearly 100 years ago, the American Bar Association was established. At its very first meeting, in 1878, it created a committee
on legal education, but nothing much happened until 1893 when
that committee became the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, the title which persists even to this day. Parenthetically, that first meeting was addressed by Professor Samuel Williston, which I find an interesting historical footnote.
Of the 72 law schools in 1894, just a few years before this law
school was established, few had admission requirements of any kind
beyond a high school degree. Not until several years later did Harvard become the first school to require a degree from an undergraduate college, but it was generations before the rest of legal education grew up to a requirement of substantial pre-law school education as a condition for admission. Legal education was not a very
big thing in the late nineteenth-century. In 1889, for instance,
there were only about 4,500 law students in all the law schools in
the country. By 1899, shortly after this law school opened its doors,
the number had nearly tripled to 12,408. The Association of
American Law Schools, of which most law schools are members
now, began in 1900 with 35 law schools. DePaul joined that organization in 1924. At the beginning the requirement for admission to law schools, as specified by the AALS, was simply high
school graduation. The requirement of a two-year law school program was increased to three years in 1906. There was also a specification that there must be an adequate library, although I am confident that what then was described as "adequate" would not be acceptable in any institution today.
Efforts to inquire into the nature of legal education and what
could be done to make it more effective began with a grant by
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the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Training in 1913.
From that beginning came three studies in the next ten years that
catalogued the nature of legal education and pointed out some of
the major deficiencies. The effort paralleled the Flexner Report
that advanced medical education at about the same time. But the
medical educators imposed rigorous standards and forced out of
business the inferior medical schools. The law schools did not do
the same, and so inferior legal education continued for decades.
In 1920, for the first time, there began to be some interest in
high quality education when Elihu Root became chairman of the
ABA Section and began to advocate higher standards for admission
to law school and for training in legal education. He called for
two years of pre-law school training at the college level, a threeyear law school program, an adequate library, and at least some
full-time law teachers, which most law schools did not have at that
time. There was also a good deal of elevated talk, as there has
been ever since, about the need to serve the public interest. But
the reality is that not much was done by legal education to serve
the public interest. We have testimony from Jerome Carlin, in
books published in 19621 and 1966,2 that many of those who graduated in the 1920's and 1930's did not have a very high sense of
ethical standards. But the number of students during this whole
period, and the number of those who went on to be admitted to
the bar, was large. Interestingly enough, during the whole period
of the 1920's through the 1950's, there were 30,000-45,000 students registered each year, except, of course, for the few years during World War II when there were almost none.
The general public attitude has never been very enthusiastic
about lawyers. You may recall the pejorative references to lawyers
that were uttered by characters out of Shakespeare and Dickens.
And I particularly like the line attributed to Samuel Johnson, who
was himself a lawyer. He said: "I do not wish to speak ill of any
man behind his back, but I do believe he is a lawyer." It was
not until the nineteenth century that anyone outstanding had
much good to say about lawyers in this country, and that was by
1. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OwN (1962).

2. J. CARLIN, LAwYERs' Emcs (1966).
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visitors from abroad: from France, Alexis DeTocqueville, and from
England, Lord Bryce. Perhaps that is why lawyers in the United
States are so fond of quoting -those two and so seldom remember
the others.
Public opinion polls have shown that the credibility of lawyers
has- not improved much, even in recent years. In a recent poll,
lawyers were well down on the public's credibility rating, in ninth
place, just above law enforcement officers, TV news reporters and
plumbers. The word "plumbers" may not have had the same significance at the time the poll was taken as it might today, but sometimes today I fear the public confuses lawyers and plumbers as
to the nature of their professional activities.
Despite the decline in the credibility of the profession, the rush
,to the bar is very significant. As you are all well aware, the demand
for: legal education has increased dramatically in the last several
years and shows no immediate sign of decline. None of us fully
understands the reasons that each year produce more than 100,000
:applications for the Law School Admission Test; and nearly that
many are 'actual applicants for fewer than 40,000 positions in
American Bar Association-approved schools. There are each year
now nearly three' times as many students in accredited law schools
in the United States as there were just twenty years ago, and there
is no indication that the number will decline. By the middle of
thig decade, 'two years from now, there will be at least 30,000 law
degrees given each year; and in almost all cases, those graduated
will be, admitted to the bar. That is roughly twice as many as the
American Bar Association Task Force on Professional Utilization has
said, can find jobs of a traditional nature. We are about to enter
a period of very real opportunities and very real dangers. Let me
outline them briefly.
First, the opportunities. Legal education now has
the best students it has ever had. It is not myth but fact that most of us
who are now teaching in law schools could not be admitted to the
law schools at which we teach if we had to face the present competition. We have, accordingly, a chance to move toward perfection, or at least great improvement, in the quality of legal education.
We should raise the professional standards of competence and of
'
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responsibility. We should serve the public better than we ever have
in the past through commitment to our professional ideals.
But there are dangers as well. If, in fact, we cannot place into
legal positions the large number of lawyers who are going to be
graduating in the next decade or two, or if the pay is not adequate,
as was often the situation in the 1920's and 1930's, we may expect
almost inevitably, however unfortunately, a decline in the ethical
standards of those who practice and scramble for the dollar in the
practice and profession of law. We also know from surveys of law
students that in general the idealism of law students declines
while they are in law school. If that means that there is also a
decline in their sensitivity to ethical problems, the law schools are
doing a markedly bad job of the one thing with which we should
be charged above all others, the inculcation of a sense of discipline
and morality into the practice of law.
A recent experience at New York University disturbed me.
While attending a seminar made up of students from the criminal
law clinic where our students practice in the criminal courts in cooperation with the Legal Aid Society, I discovered that none of them
had seen the Code of Professional Responsibility. The instructor
in the seminar, who had prepared a kind of "counter" code of professional responsibility, asked the students to point out its errors;
but he found that many of the students thought that it was not necessarily bad in the criminal courts to do almost anything short of cheating and stealing on behalf of a client, placing responsibility to the
client above all. Although the matter came out better than I had
feared as I saw the experiment in progress, thanks to the skill of
the instructor, it illustrates what I believe is a common failure to
grasp the nettle of dealing with problems of professional responsibility and ethics within law schools.
What has been the response of legal education to these challenges? In the main, disappointing. In the 1920's and the 1930's
the emphasis was on minimal competence, and I emphasize minimal. In most law schools, or at least in many law schools and for
many practitioners, the aim was simply to pass the bar and get into
practice. Since then, -there has been much talk in more elevated
terms. We have had conference after conference on professional
responsibility; we have talked about the pervasive method of teaching
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legal ethics in all courses; and we have talked about how to teach
professional responsibility in legal profession courses. But I suspect
that we have not succeeded very well in most American law schools.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by the American Bar Association, and by most states since 1969, is a great improvement over the Canons of Legal Ethics that preceded it. It
deals more realistically with many of the problems. But I think
it, too, is disappointing in the narrowness of its reach to the real
issues that should be confronting legal education and lawyers in their
professional life. Thus, we continue to accept the fact of a fragmented bar, in which each state has its own bar examination and,
to some extent, its own standards of legal education. In New York,
for example, the Court of Appeals, our highest state court, has
promulgated rules which are different in some respects from those
established by the American Bar Association and the Association
of American Law Schools. The still-prevailing notion is that each
state may set its own standards for admission to the bar, standards
of competence and of professional responsibility. The matter is not
easily resolved, but the fact is that little real attention has been given
to the issue.
A second problem, as I phrase it rather too broadly, is that a
lawyer's competence must be concealed, arising out of the perfectly
sound principle that lawyers should not advertise and should not
solicit business. In deference to this principle, the organized bar
is only beginning to confront the question of specialized training
and certification of competence, generally and in specialized areas.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not address the central question of how the profession is going to go about the business
of assuring adequate legal representation to all persons in the United
States. The rich have always been able to take care of themselves,
and the law schools mostly train to provide service for the wellto-do. We now recognize our responsibility at the other end of
the scale and do a fair-to-middling job of providing adequate legal
services for the poor. But the great middle class, which embraces
most of us, about 70 percent of the American population, is not
provided adequate legal representation. It is here that I think the
bar must give attention to providing new ways to meet that problem,
which may coincidentally provide employment for many of the law-
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yers who will emerge from the law schools in the near future. The
need is for prepaid legal services, other kinds of group legal services
plans, and other means of providing vastly improved legal services
to those who need them throughout the country.
Another concern relates to civility in the courtroom. We have
all been concerned about problems of disorder in the courtroom.
A committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
has just completed a comprehensive study of that, now published
under -the title Disorder in the Courtroom. As a member of that
committee, I discovered, somewhat to my surprise, that the episodes
of disorder are not very numerous. While the problems of disorder
are not quantitatively significant, they do have an important bearing
on public confidence in the judicial system and thus the problem
with which we are all faced: What is the best way to deal with
the problem of lack of confidence in the system? One law professor quoted in the volume says this: "The canons are as much use
to a practicing attorney in the courtroom as a Valentine card would
be to a surgeon in the operating room." An overstatement, I am
sure, but there is just enough truth in it to remind that we have
not addressed ourselves to the most important problems. Dean Albert Sacks of the Harvard Law School emphasized the difficulty of
defining disorder when he appeared as a witness before the committee. He said, "If you tell me exactly how a professor should conduct
his class, I'll tell you exactly how a lawyer must act in the courtroom."
Another problem has to do with character evaluation. A year
and a half ago the American Bar Association, or at least a committee
of the American Bar Association, proposed that law schools undertake the job of screening for character traits and determine on the
basis of admission to law school who was qualified morally, ethically,
and professionally to enter law school. The outcry from the law
schools was so sharp that the plan was quickly abandoned, so we
return to the more subjective and less certain means of dealing with
the question of admission to law school and admission to the bar,
including the advice of character committees.
What then are the real issues? We must learn how to capitalize
on the moral commitment and the public service enthusiasm of our
youth, those who are still in college or high school as well as those
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who are in law school. This is a great natural resource which must
not be dissipated. To be sure, sometimes our youth have been misguided; witness some of the initiatives between 1968 and 1971.
But it is not clear to me that fault should not be partly attributable
to those of us who are their seniors for failing to respond adequately
to their concern about such problems as racial justice, equal treatment for the rich and the poor, improvement in higher education,
and government morality. The danger now is that we might drift
back to a period in which individuals think only about their individual security and their private concerns, forgetting to reach for
a higher standard for the community as a whole. We must not
lose the initiative that I think is still at hand.
The issues for the profession require more careful self-examination than we have yet undertaken. Socrates said an unexamined life
is not worth living. In paraphrase, I suggest that an unexamined
profession is not worth practicing. We have an obligation, as
I have suggested, to provide adequate-in fact, better than adequate, good legal services for all individuals. We should encourage
plans for prepaid legal services. We must welcome specialization
as a way of making the services of lawyers available wherever and
whenever needed. We must figure out ways to use paraprofessional
training sensibly; and we must make sure that continuing legal education does an educational job as well as providing a pleasant respite
for an evening or a weekend.
We must give greater attention to the administration of justice
than sometimes we have as a profession. We must be concerned
about proper standards for the selection of judges. We must make
sure that there is an effective administration of all the court systems,
including a unified court structure and a unified court budget
(which I understand has been better achieved in Illinois than almost
anywhere else). We must perfect our ways for disciplining judges
and lawyers who are lax or lazy or inefficient or corrupt or dishonest.
And we must, above all, improve the administration of the criminal
justice system.
The issues for legal education have to do with many of the same
qualities because we stand at the threshold of entry into the profession. I suggest that the law schools must examine more carefully
how to combine training for professional competence, which I think
we do rather well, with training for professional responsibility, which
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I fear we do badly. There are difficulties. It is easier to say what
is wrong with the way we train for professional responsibility now
than it is to say what is right. For example: Should professional
responsibility be taught in a special course required of all students,
or should it be done pervasively throughout the curriculum? Can
professional responsibility be taught 'by lecture? Can a sense of
ethics be conveyed in clinical programs? I believe that much can
be done in clinical programs, and I welcome as a model the kind
of in-house clinic that DePaul has at the present time, providing
a serious effort to train students in the actual administration of the
courts and administrative agencies and an avowed commitment to
the issues of professional responsibility.
The faculty of New York University has voted to deal with this
question by doing some of these things on an experimental basis.
In addition, we have offered to sponsor jointly with the Association
of American Law Schools a workshop to figure out better ways to
provide training in professional responsibility. The American Bar
Association now requires such training for all law students. A few
years ago I am not sure we would have welcomed that requirement. We
might have thought it inappropriate or too difficult, preferring not
to be told what to do. Now I believe we welcome the requirement because we recognize how badly we have done. Watergate
has emphasized the imperfection of our efforts.
We must have in the law schools, as in higher education generally, a broader base for the training of women and members of
minority groups. The effort to attract minority students to legal
education presents problems, as we know from the case of DeFunis
v. Odegaard, in which the Washington Supreme Court validated
the practices of the University of Washington Law School in applying preferential admission standards for minority group members.
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted review of the
case, raising a question whether law schools will be allowed to continue the methods they have used in the past few years to attract
to the profession the broadened racial and ethnic balance that most
of us believe is so necessary.
3. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169, cert. granted, 42 U.S.LW. 3306 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 1973) (No. 235), vacated as moot, 42 U.S.L.W. 4578 (U.S. April 23, 1974).
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In conclusion, I join with Chief Justice Warren in saying: "Every
lawyer has an additional civic obligation, somewhat higher than that
of one not privileged to belong to our profession, and that is to
further the cause of sound government." I rest upon those words
of our great Chief Justice.

